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The Battle of the Bulge: The Surprising Last
Stand Against State Marijuana Legalization
Sam Kamin
University of Denver College of Law; skamin@law.du.edu
5 Although marijuana possession remains a federal crime, twenty-three states now allow use of
marijuana for medical purposes and four states have adopted tax-and-regulate policies permitting
use and possession by those twenty-one and over. In this article, I examine recent developments
regardingmarijuana regulation. I show that the Obama administration, after initially sendingmixed
signals, has taken several steps indicating an increasingly accepting position toward marijuana law
10 reform in states, even as the current situation regarding the dual legal status of marijuana is at best
an unstable equilibrium. I also focus on what might be deemed the last stand of marijuana-
legalization opponents, in the form of lawsuits filed by several states, sheriffs, and private plaintiffs
challengingmarijuana reform in Colorado (and by extension elsewhere).This analysis offers insights
for federalism scholars regarding the speed with which marijuana law reform has occurred, the
15 positions taken by various state and federal actors, and possible collaborative federalism solutions
to the current state-federal standoff.
Although the federal government continues to treat marijuana as a Schedule
I narcotic—a drug whose manufacture, distribution, and possession are all serious
20 federal crimes—an ever-increasing number of states are adopting very different
approaches to regulating the drug. As of this writing twenty-three states plus the
District of Colombia have authorized the use of marijuana for medical purposes
(Marijuana Policy Project 2014) and four states—Colorado, Washington, Oregon,
and Alaska—along with D.C. have taken the additional step of taxing and
25 regulating the manufacture and sale of small amounts of the drug to anyone over
the age of twenty-one. Both adult use and medical marijuana initiatives will be on
the ballot in several states in 2016 (Ballotpedia 2015) and polls consistently show
strong majorities of Americans now favoring the full legalization of marijuana
(Saad 2014).
30 This changing marijuana climate in the United States raises important questions
regarding the distribution of power between the state and federal governments
(Pickerill and Chen 2008) and offers several insights regarding the avenues through
which political change can be achieved in the U.S. federal system. Marijuana
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activity is the only conduct completely prohibited by federal law while explicitly
authorized in a growing number of states. It is easy enough to forget that all
marijuana conduct remains illegal throughout the United States, even in those
states adopting marijuana law reform. The resulting status quo is an uneasy one;
5 the continued federal illegality of all marijuana conduct creates a world of risk and
uncertainty for those using marijuana or producing and distributing it in accord
with state law.
After the passage of the first full legalization initiatives in 2012, it seemed only a
matter of time before the federal government sought to block Colorado and
10 Washington from implementing their tax-and-regulate initiatives. U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder had threatened to do exactly that just two years earlier when
California considered its own legalization initiative (Hoeffel 2010). That showdown
never came, however. Instead, the federal government adopted a wait-and-see
approach, allowing the two states to experiment with regulating marijuana rather
15 than prohibiting it and emboldening other states to pass similar laws (Cole 2013).
In fact, as legalized marijuana gathered steam throughout the western states, it
seemed that the federalism showdown, many had been preparing for, would never
arrive; the repeal of the federal marijuana prohibition began to seem inevitable.
As 2014 became 2015, however, a number of surrogates stepped into the place of
20 the indifferent federal government, suing Colorado in federal court and seeking to
enjoin the operation of Colorado’s regulatory regime for adult-use marijuana. To
date, four suits have been filed on a number of separate but related theories,
seeking to roll back the regulatory apparatus in Colorado—and by analogy
elsewhere. I call these suits the Battle of the Bulge for marijuana law reform
25 opponents. With legalization sure to be on the ballot in a number of states in 2016,
these suits operate as a last-gasp offensive against the swift and continued success
of marijuana legalization at the ballot box.
In this article, I examine recent developments regarding marijuana regulation and
draw lessons from this case about the way political reform can be achieved in the
30 U.S. federal system. I begin by describing the stable if unsatisfying equilibrium of the
moment, under which marijuana is legal for some purposes in an increasing number
of states whereas remaining criminal at the federal level. Although an uneasy truce is
in place between state and federal governments, this situation cannot continue in the
long term. Second, I discuss the continued softening of the federal government’s
35 previously hardline against marijuana. Starting with the executive’s decision to
permit states to experiment with marijuana law reform, the federal government has
taken a number of steps, both formal and informal and through both legislative and
executive actions, that indicate an increasingly accepting position toward marijuana
legal change. Finally, I discuss the surrogates who have stepped into this vacuum of
40 federal enforcement, seeking to do what the federal government has the power to do
but has chosen not to—to end marijuana law reform in the states.
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This analysis offers several insights for federalism scholars, regarding both the
unusual way reform has been achieved in this case and the surprising positions
taken by a diverse set of state and federal actors. We generally expect reversals of
federal policies to be achieved through congressional statutes or U.S. Supreme
5 Court decisions. In the case of marijuana legalization, however, reform was
initiated in the states, principally through the initiative process. Only recently have
we seen grudging but growing acceptance on the part of federal executive officials.
These recent developments also pose a challenge to the conventional assumption
that state officials generally try to expand state autonomy, whereas federal officials
10 seek to limit state autonomy when state and federal authority come in conflict.
Marijuana law reform did follow this standard script for a period of time, in that
federal officials initially responded to state legalization measures with threats of
retaliation. In recent years, however, federal officials increasingly acquiesced to state
legalization acts, due largely to a recognition that the federal government is, in
15 practice, unable to enforce federal marijuana policy against unwilling states. At the
same time, current challenges to state autonomy are coming not from federal
officials but rather from state officials, along with other plaintiffs, and in a way that
challenges dominant understandings about the behavior of federal and state
officials.
20 Regulation of Marijuana in the United States
Ebbing and Flowing Federal Enforcement
In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 215, thus making California the
first state in the nation to authorize the use of marijuana for medical purposes.
Since then, twenty-two states plus the District of Columbia have followed suit,
25 creating a medical use exception to their criminal laws generally prohibiting
marijuana use, possession, and distribution. These medical-use exceptions stood—
and continue to stand—in sharp contrast to federal law, which prohibits marijuana
entirely, even in those states purporting to authorize it. As a Schedule I drug under
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the production, distribution, and possession
30 of marijuana are all serious federal crimes, punishable by long terms of
imprisonment (CSA of 1970).
Marijuana’s dual status in law reform states—permitted under state law
although remaining strictly prohibited under federal law—creates novel federalism
questions. There is simply no precedent in American history for conduct that is
35 prohibited at the federal although permitted in a large number of states. As a result,
the early years of marijuana law reform were marked by uncertainty, as the medical
marijuana industry grew up in the shadow of the threat of federal enforcement.
During this period, the Obama administration issued a number of policy
statements designed to help federal prosecutors exercise their discretion over
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marijuana prosecutions in an environment of legal change in the states. Although
addressed specifically to the nation’s federal prosecutors, these statements were also
read like tea leaves by marijuana activists in the states, likely creating more
confusion than clarity on the issue. For example, in October 2009 the Obama
5 Administration inadvertently kicked off a boom in medical marijuana dispensaries
when it issued the so-called Ogden Memo. That memo read: ‘‘As a general matter,
pursuit of [federal] priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on
individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing
state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.’’ (Ogden 2009) It is true that
10 the Ogden memo was loaded with cautionary language, noting at one point:
‘‘This memorandum is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to
create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in
any matter civil or criminal.’’ (Ogden 2009, 2) Nevertheless, it was taken by many
to be a green light to the development in the states of commercial marijuana
15 markets.
That this reading was an error was made clear two years later with the
circulation of the Cole Memo, which declared: ‘‘The Ogden Memorandum was
never intended to shield such activities from federal enforcement action and
prosecution, even where those activities purport to comply with state law. Persons
20 who are in the business of cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana, and those
who knowingly facilitate such activities, are in violation of the CSA, regardless of
state law.’’ (Cole 2011) In other words, the Cole Memo reiterated the federal
government’s willingness to enforce federal law even in those states that were
modifying their own marijuana laws. And during these years the federal
25 government did just that, enforcing the CSA—albeit sporadically—throughout
those states that were allowing marijuana to be grown and sold to those who could
demonstrate a medical use of the drug (Kelly 2012; KABC-TV 2011).
During this time, and notwithstanding the new bellicose tone from Washington,
nationwide support for marijuana legalization continued to rise, both in public
30 opinion polls and at the ballot boxes. One by one, states joined the list of those
permitting medical marijuana use. Meanwhile, an initiative to make marijuana use
and possession legal for all adults narrowly failed to pass in California in 2010
(California Secretary of State 2010). Although the Obama administration actively
opposed the passage of that initiative and threatened to retaliate against the state if
35 it passed, in 2012 it remained largely silent as Colorado and Washington became
the first states in the union to actually authorize possession of marijuana by
anyone over the age of twenty-one (Coffman and Neroulias 2012). The federal
government’s opposition to the prospect of legalization in California and then
puzzling silence after it passed in Colorado and Washington—coupled with its
40 willingness to enforce federal law against those in medical marijuana states—led to
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wide-spread uncertainty whether the federal government would use its resources to
attempt to block legalization efforts in these states and elsewhere.
There followed nine months of uncertainty as Colorado and Washington
ramped up their regulatory efforts in the shadow of uneasy silence from the
5 nation’s capital. Given the complex nature of this regulatory task facing these
states—no jurisdiction in the world had ever legalized, taxed, and regulated
marijuana, let alone one within a federal system continuing to prohibit it—the
Governors of the two states appealed to the nation’s capital for some indication of
whether the federal government would seek to block full implementation of the
10 legalization initiatives. Finally, on August 29, 2013, with the issuance of a Second
Cole Memo, the federal government announced that it would allow Colorado and
Washington to proceed with their tax and regulation experiment:
In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and
that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement
15 systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of
marijuana, conduct in compliance with those laws and regulation is less likely
to threaten the federal priorities set forth above . . . In those circumstances,
consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area,
enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory
20 bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related
activity. (Cole 2013)
In doing so, the Department of Justice also announced the eight criteria it would
be using to monitor state progress on marijuana regulation going forward:
25 The Department in recent years has focused its efforts on certain enforcement
priorities that are particularly important to the federal government:
 preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
 preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal
enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
30  preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state
law in some form to other states;
 preventing state authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or
pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;
 preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of
35 marijuana;
 preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health
consequences associated with marijuana use;
 preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety
and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and
40  preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property (Cole 2013).
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Uneasy Status Quo
While this announcement of the Obama administration’s wait-and-see enforcement
position was welcome news in those states engaged in the difficult regulatory work
required to tax and regulate marijuana, it is important to understand why this
5 policy pronouncement is far from a solution to the federalism questions raised by
marijuana law reform. For one thing, as the torturous history of pronouncements
from the Department of Justice makes clear, a statement of nonenforcement from
Washington is only effective until that policy is amended. With an election looming
in 2016 and a new administration certain to take office, there is no guarantee that
10 the new president and attorney general will share the Obama administration’s wait-
and-see approach. More fundamentally, however, a promise of federal none-
nforcement is inherently unsatisfying from the perspective of marijuana reform
advocates. Much more follows from marijuana’s continuing criminality than just
the threat of arrest and prosecution. The fact of marijuana’s ongoing criminality
15 colors both the nascent marijuana industry and those who would seek to be its
customers.
Even after the federal government made clear that it would not be intervening to
block the implementation of marijuana legalization, marijuana remains illegal,
creating hurdles for those who would attempt to make a business out of the
20 production and distribution of the drug. The most well known of these obstacles is
probably the banking problem (Hill 2015). Marijuana businesses—both medical
and retail—have faced an inability to obtain even the most basic of banking
services. Dealing in the proceeds of marijuana transactions has always carried with
it the threat of money-laundering charges, and the federal government—which is
25 largely responsible for regulating banks—has not hesitated to remind financial
institutions of the risks of catering to the marijuana industry (Cole 2011).1
Although the Justice and Treasury Departments have produced new guidelines for
financial institutions dealing with marijuana clients, these new regulations seem to
have done little to hurry the availability of banking services to those marijuana
30 businesses that most need them (e.g., Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
[FinCEN] 2014).2
As a result of the marijuana industry’s inability to obtain banking services,
marijuana is largely a cash business today with all of the attendant problems that
come with it (Hill 2015, 6). The irony, of course, is that by keeping marijuana a
35 cash-only business, the federal government is making it increasingly difficult for the
states to comply with the announced enforcement criteria on which the federal
government has announced they will be judged. Marijuana business owners,
knowing they are targets for criminals, may resort to self-help to protect
themselves, increasing the possibility that marijuana businesses will become
40 associated with ‘‘violence and the use of firearms’’ (Cole 2013). For this reason, the
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interests of the industry and its state regulators are perfectly aligned with regard to
banking—the provision of banking services would make life easier and safer for
marijuana businesses and would aid regulators in making sure that state regulations
were being complied with.
5 Marijuana businesses also face disadvantageous federal tax rules as a result of the
drug’s continued federal prohibition. Under a Reagan-era tax provision, those
violating the CSA (but not other federal laws) are required to pay taxes on their
earnings but are not entitled to take the deductions that other businesses are
(Roche 2013). With the exception of the costs of goods, marijuana businesses must
10 pay federal tax on their gross revenues (Roche 2013, 437). This can have crippling
consequences on a growing business; in fact, it is hard to imagine any business that
could survive without deducting those things that account for the bulk of ordinary
business expenses—rent, insurance, salaries, etc.
For the marijuana consumer things are, if anything, more problematic and less
15 certain than they are for those in the marijuana business. Aside from the remote yet
persistent threat of prosecution and incarceration, perhaps the biggest risk
marijuana users face is the loss of employment as a result of their marijuana use.
The most high-profile case, to come to light, thus far is that of Brandon Coats in
Colorado (Coats v. Dish Network, 303 P.3 d 147 [2013]). Mr. Coats, a quadriplegic
20 who uses medical marijuana to control seizures was fired by his employer for
testing positive for marijuana even though there was no evidence in the record that
he was ever impaired during work hours. He complained that the state’s lawful off-
duty conduct statute precluded his termination for using marijuana in compliance
with state law, but both the state trial and intermediate appellate courts disagreed,
25 reasoning that ‘‘because plaintiff’s state-licensed medical marijuana use was, at the
time of his termination, subject to and prohibited by federal law, we conclude that
it was not ‘lawful activity.’ ’’ (Coats v. Dish Network, 152).
As serious as it is, losing one’s livelihood is only one of the many risks still being
taken by those choosing to use marijuana consistent with the laws of their states.
30 Hence, for example, the Aid Elimination Penalty of the Higher Education Act, 20
USC x 1091, delays or denies federal financial aid to those convicted of drug crimes
in either state or federal court. Since going into effect in 2000, up to 200,000
students have been rendered ineligible for federal aid under the law (Students for
Sensible Drug Policy n.d.). Furthermore, parents who use marijuana risk losing
35 their parental rights if their use of marijuana is found to be detrimental to the
safety of their minor children. For example, the case of five-month-old Bree Green
made headlines in 2013 when she was taken from her parents by Michigan Child
Protective Services after reports of marijuana being present in the home. Although
her mother was a licensed marijuana care-giver under state law, the child was
40 nonetheless removed from the home (Palmer 2013).
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Even this partial list of the negative consequences stemming from marijuana’s
continuing illegality under federal law should make clear that even a federal
promise not to prosecute marijuana users and businesses results in a status quo
that is unsatisfying from the perspective of a number of political actors, including
5 but not limited to citizens and state officials seeking enhanced autonomy regarding
regulation of marijuana.3 It leaves those, both in the marijuana business and using
marijuana pursuant to state law, without a full understanding of their rights or an
appreciation of the risks associated with their conduct. It is not surprising,
therefore, that advocates of marijuana law reform have pressed federal officials to
10 take further steps to relax or even cease enforcement of the CSA in states with
contrary policies. Furthermore, as we will see below, the status quo is unsatisfying
to those in favor of the federal prohibition as well; to many of them, the promise
not to enforce the CSA is nothing more than an abdication of the Obama
administration’s obligation to enforce the law as written. It is this frustration that
15 has led to the recent litigation over the validity of state marijuana laws.
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation
In seeking to bring about change in federal marijuana policy, reformers have
enjoyed little success pressing their case in the U.S. Supreme Court, which has
made clear that Congress possesses broad authority to regulate marijuana and that
20 the Justice Department may enforce those regulations even in states legalizing
marijuana. There are limits, however, on what the federal government may force
the states to do on its behalf; the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth
Amendment operates as a significant drag on the federal government’s ability to
impose a uniform drug policy on the states. Furthermore, the Obama
25 administration seemed to grow weary of enforcing the federal marijuana
prohibition in the states, leading the Justice Department to issue a series of
memos tacitly endorsing marijuana reform in the states and, most recently, in
Indian Country. In terms of congressional action, various bills to amend the CSA
by limiting its applicability in marijuana reform states have attracted support from
30 a bipartisan and diverse cast of house and senate members and generated more
attention than in prior years. The main congressional action to date, is a Fiscal Year
2015 appropriations act provision prohibiting use of federal funds to enforce the
CSA against persons in medical-use states; although the exact protections afforded
by this measure are unclear, it stands as an indication of Congress’ increasing
35 willingness to move away from an absolute marijuana prohibition.
Supreme Court Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that Congress has the authority, quite
broadly, to regulate marijuana throughout the country. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545
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U.S. 1 (2005), the Supreme Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the
CSA, finding that even marijuana grown on a patient’s own property for her own
use had an effect on the interstate market for marijuana and was thus within
Congress’ reach. What is more, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
5 Collective, 532 U.S. 483 (2001), the Supreme Court made explicit what the CSA
clearly implies: it is no defense in a federal prosecution under CSA that the
defendant was acting in compliance with applicable state law. Together, these cases
solidify the power of the federal government to criminalize all marijuana conduct
and to enforce that law even in states coming to a very different conclusion about
10 the propriety of such conduct.
Beyond these foundational principles, however, things are not quite so clear.
Although federal law remains the law of the land and applies with equal force
throughout the country regardless of state law to the contrary, the reality is that the
federal government is dependent upon the states for the effectuation of marijuana
15 policy. Although the CSA has been the eight-hundred pound gorilla of marijuana
prohibition, in reality the federal government does a vanishingly small amount of
the drug enforcement that occurs in the United States each year; nearly everyone
arrested on marijuana charges is arrested under state rather than federal authority
(Marijuana Policy Project 2013, 2). It is equally clear that the federal government
20 cannot simply outsource the enforcement of federal law to unwilling state
governments in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Court held that
although states are free to cooperate in the enforcement of federal law if they wish
to do so, state apparatuses cannot be conscripted into the service of federal policy:
‘‘The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
25 address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It
matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.’’ (Printz v. U.S., 935) Thus,
30 although the federal government may arrest anyone in any state who is producing
or selling marijuana, it lacks the resources (and, quite clearly, the will) to arrest,
prosecute, and incarcerate all of those who are not in compliance with federal law.
It is for this reason that much of the speculation after the passage of
Amendment 64 in Colorado and Initiative 502 in Washington State in 2012 focused
35 not on the threat of increased prosecutions under federal law, but rather on legal
action by the federal government to curtail the nascent regulatory processes. In
particular, the states feared that the federal government would sue to prevent the
implementation of the new regulatory regimes as it had sued just a few years earlier
to enjoin the operation of Arizona’s new immigration regulations. Arizona v.
40 United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012). It was with such a suit in mind that the
governors of Washington and Colorado appealed to the federal government for
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guidance regarding the federal government’s enforcement intentions; with heavy
regulatory work ahead of them, the states wanted some assurance that their
regulations would not be immediately undone by federal legal action.
Executive Branch Actions
5 As we have seen, the U.S. Justice Department announced in August 2013 that it
would allow marijuana regulations to proceed in the states so long as eight
enforcement priorities were complied with. This pronouncement forestalled, at least
for the moment, the threat of a federal preemption suit in the federal courts. More
than that, however, it seemed to signal a significant, if not radical, change at the
10 federal level with regard to marijuana policy. For example, in January 2014
President Obama told the New Yorker magazine that he thought that marijuana was
less dangerous than alcohol and expressed his thoughts on marijuana law reform in
the states that: ‘‘it’s important for it to go forward because it’s important for
society not to have a situation in which a large portion of people have at one time
15 or another broken the law and only a select few get punished’’ (Remnick 2014).4
Obama’s departing Attorney General Eric Holder—whose intervention in California
was one of the factors that doomed Proposition 19 in California in 2010—also
seemed to have an evolution in his views on the subject. When asked in late 2014 if
he would support the rescheduling of marijuana, he seemed quite open to the idea:
20 I think it’s certainly a question we need to ask ourselves, whether or not
marijuana is as serious of a drug as heroin. Especially given what we’ve seen
recently with regard to heroin – the progression of people from using opioids
to heroin use, the spread and the destruction that heroin has perpetrated all
around our country. And to see by contrast, what the impact is of marijuana
25 use. Now it can be destructive if used in certain ways, but the question of
whether or not they should be in the same category is something that we
need to ask ourselves and use science as the basis for making that
determination (Ferner 2014).
What is more, the executive branch’s apparent change in direction was not limited
30 to unofficial statements given in interviews given by senior members of the
administration. For example, the Obama administration surprised many when it
announced, apparently unprovoked, a memo indicating that it would treat
marijuana in Indian Country the same way it does in states legalizing marijuana for
some purposes. The memo, dated October 2014 but first made public in December
35 2014, stated in part: ‘‘The eight priorities in the Cole Memorandum will guide
United States Attorneys’ marijuana enforcement efforts in Indian Country,
including in the event that sovereign Indian Nations seek to legalize the cultivation
or use of marijuana in Indian Country’’ (Wilkinson 2014). There had not been
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much controversy with regard to marijuana production and sale on tribal lands
prior to the issuance of this directive. Even more than the issuance of the Ogden
memo nearly six years earlier, this pronouncement seemed like little more than an
invitation to the nation’s Indian tribes to consider the production of marijuana.
5 Taken together with the FinCEN guidance regarding banking and the second Cole
Memo issued in 2013, all of these statements—both official and unofficial—provide
mounting evidence of a much more cooperative approach to marijuana federalism
within the Obama administration.
Congressional Actions and Proposals
10 During this period developments in Congress also seemed to signal an interest on
the part of many legislators in significantly curtailing federal prohibition. For
example, the Regulate Marijuana like Alcohol Act (2015) was introduced in the
House by Colorado Representative Jared Polis. The name of the measure should be
familiar; this was the appellation given to Amendment 64, Colorado’s 2012
15 marijuana legalization initiative. Polis’ bill would remove marijuana from the CSA,
retaining punishments only for the international trafficking of the drug. Similarly,
Representative Earl Blumenauer of Oregon introduced the Marijuana Tax Revenue
Act (2015), calling for the federal taxing of adult-use marijuana (medical marijuana
would be immune from tax under the provision). The introduction of these bills
20 was not new; similar bills had been before Congress for years, rarely generating
much traction.
The largest change, though, and one that actually made its way into law, was
likely the quietest. Buried in the massive year-end budget resolution that passed
Congress in late 2014, in paragraph 538, was a prohibition on the use of
25 government funds to impede state medical marijuana laws:
None of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice
may be used . . . to prevent such States from implementing their own State
laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical
marijuana. (Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015,
30 para. 538)
When President Obama signed this spending bill on December 16, 2014 press
reports trumpeted this provision as the end of the federal war on medical
marijuana in the states (e.g., Halper 2014). To many, this provision seemed to be
the solidifying into law of the Second Cole Memo’s wait-and-see approach;
35 paragraph 538 appeared to give state marijuana law reform experiments the explicit
federal protection they had been craving. It is not clear, however, exactly what
the provision means. Certainly, it would seem to prohibit the Department of
Justice from suing to enjoin or prevent the implementation of medical marijuana
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provisions in the states. Whether it would preclude all federal law enforcement
action against those acting in compliance with state law, however, is another
question.5 Certainly, if that were Congress’ intention, such a provision would be
easy enough to draft.6 But what is more, this spending provision does not legalize
5 marijuana, it merely makes the enforcement of existing federal prohibition more
difficult. As discussed in the previous section, it is the illegality of marijuana at the
federal level that causes so many of the problems seen at the state level. The 2014
spending bill does nothing to change this.
Other bills that would radically transform the federal prohibition are in the
10 works as well. In early 2015, three prominent senators—Cory Booker (D-NJ),
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), and Rand Paul (R-KY)—introduced the Compassionate
Access, Research Expansion, and Respect States (CARERS) Act (2015). The
CARERS Act would make the CSA inapplicable to those acting in compliance with
their state’s medical marijuana laws and would immediately make banking available
15 to all marijuana businesses. It would also allow increased medical experimentation
on marijuana’s effects and remove entirely from the CSA low potency marijuana
products used to treat medical conditions. Unlike the appropriations bill passed in
2014, the CARERS Act would make marijuana conduct in law reform states legal
rather than simply immune from prosecution. The CARERS Act, like the bills
20 introduced by Representatives Blumenauer and Polis, is thus as close to a repeal of
the CSA as we are likely to see in the near term. What is more, because it has been
proposed by a bipartisan coalition of well-known senators from states at the fringes
of marijuana law reform, it is likely to be taken far more seriously than the annual
updates sponsored by marijuana’s two principal advocates in Congress.7
25 Lawsuits
With the Obama administration’s increasing acceptance of state marijuana
legalization and growing support in Congress for measures curtailing enforcement
of the CSA, a number of other actors stepped into the void. Angered that the
federal government had moved away from enforcement of the CSA in marijuana
30 law reform states and the apparent changing mood in Washington, state
governments, public officials, and private individuals began suing Colorado
entities—both public and private—seeking to undo marijuana legalization there.
On December 17, 2014, the states of Oklahoma and Nebraska sought to sue
Colorado in the U.S. Supreme Court (Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado). The
35 states alleged that the taxation and regulation of marijuana in Colorado created a
casus belli8—they argued that marijuana flooding into their states across the
Colorado border created negative consequences including increased law enforce-
ment and court expenditures. Although the states did not ask for money damages,
they did ask the Supreme Court to declare Colorado’s regulatory regime preempted
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by the CSA. Except for the fact that the neighboring states were standing in for the
federal government, the Oklahoma and Nebraska lawsuit was in many ways the one
that marijuana law reform proponents had been girding for since the passage of
legalization initiatives in 2012.
5 If the Oklahoma and Nebraska suit was largely by the book, the next set of suits
that were filed was anything but. In February 2015 two private plaintiffs brought
suits under the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act
naming a number of defendants including marijuana businesses, their financiers,
insurers, contractors, and the state and local entities that had licensed them (Safe
10 Streets Alliance, Phillis Windy Hope Reilly, and Michael P. Reilly v. Alternative
Holistic Healing, 1:15-cv-00349; Safe Streets Alliance and New Vision Hotels Two,
LLC v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies, 1:15-cv-00350).9 These suits alleged that
the imminent opening of two licensed marijuana businesses has caused the
plaintiffs and would continue to cause the plaintiffs harm. In one suit, an hotelier
15 alleged that the planned opening of a marijuana dispensary in the same retail
complex has led to guest cancellations; in the other, a rural land owner alleged that
her enjoyment of her property has been hampered by the construction of a
marijuana cultivation facility on the adjacent property.
The final barrage (to date) came the next month when a number of sheriffs
20 from Colorado and neighboring states sued seeking to enjoin both Colorado’s
regulatory regime and its decision to legalize marijuana for adult users. The sheriffs
argue that ‘‘[t]he formulation of policy for controlling and regulating these
controlled substances and for balancing of controlled-substances regulation,
possession, and distribution priorities is a matter exclusively reserved for the federal
25 government. Such regulations do not fall within the state’s traditional police
powers and remain the exclusive province of the federal government’’ (Smith et al.
v. Hickenlooper, 1:15-cv-00462, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, para. 38). Because sheriffs are
sworn to uphold both the state and federal constitutions, the suit alleges, the
passage of Amendment 64 and its implementing legislation place the plaintiffs in an
30 unresolvable bind—they simply cannot uphold both oaths (Smith et al. v.
Hickenlooper, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, para. 78).
As I explain below, I believe all three sets of suits are without merit. They are
important for these purposes, though, because they represent the last stand of
marijuana law reform opponents against a steady stream of legislative and voter
35 victories for marijuana law reformers. Faced with the prospect of legalization in as
many as a half-dozen additional states by 2016, those seeking to maintain the
federal prohibition seem to have realized that if they did not act soon, events on
the ground would leave them behind. These suits represent a Battle of the Bulge—a
last desperate offensive by an army in full retreat. Additionally, and of particular
40 note for federalism scholars, these lawsuits seeking to limit state autonomy
regarding marijuana regulation have been filed not by federal officials seeking to
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maintain their own authority but by state governments and officials, along with a
range of private plaintiffs.
The Oklahoma and Nebraska Preemption Lawsuits
A number of potential criticisms could be leveled at the Oklahoma and Nebraska
5 lawsuits. First, the complaints are pled in a very bare bones manner, filled with
allegations of injury that call on a court to make many significant logical leaps.
When plaintiffs allege that their enforcement costs have increased as a result of
marijuana flowing into (or through) their states from Colorado they are susceptible
to the criticism that they have either chosen to increase their marijuana
10 enforcement efforts or else have shifted their enforcement efforts from targeting
marijuana imported from Mexico or California to targeting marijuana imported
from Colorado. In either event, the state cannot sue Colorado because it has chosen
to reassign its own enforcement priorities. Absent some objective showing of
increased drug trafficking, it simply does not follow from the fact that the plaintiff
15 states are spending more on marijuana interdiction than they were prior to the
passage of Amendment 64 that they have been harmed by Colorado’s decision to
tax and regulate marijuana rather than prohibit it.
Although issues of this sort could be solved through amended pleading, other,
more fundamental, obstacles remain in the path of the plaintiff states. For example,
20 the conduct about which the states complain—the importation of marijuana from
Colorado into Oklahoma and Nebraska—is conduct that is illegal under the laws of
the federal government, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Colorado. Thus, the states are
complaining not about Colorado’s regulation of adult use marijuana but about
those criminals who are not complying with those regulations. As the U.S. Supreme
25 Court has made clear, when challenging government conduct, ‘‘there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury
has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not .
. . the] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court’
’’ (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 [1992], internal citation
30 omitted). Here, there is no plausible argument that it is agents of the state of
Colorado that are directly causing harm to the plaintiff states.
Even more fundamental, though, is the central legal question raised by the
Oklahoma and Nebraska suit and, at least in part, by each of the others that has been
filed to date: whether Colorado’s regulatory regime is preempted by the CSA. As the
35 most anticipated and straightforward of the lawsuits filed against Colorado, the
Oklahoma and Nebraska suit is probably the one that has been most fully theorized
by scholars. A number of authors (e.g., Mikos 2009, 1446)—myself included—have
written on the topic of whether state marijuana regulation is preempted by existing
federal law, and the clear consensus seems to be that they are not.
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This result might seem counterintuitive. If, as the plaintiff states rightly allege,
the goal of the CSA is to treat marijuana as a criminal substance—a substance with
no legitimate medical use and a high likelihood of abuse—then the decisions of the
several states to treat marijuana as medicine and a potential source of revenue are
5 clearly in tension with that federal policy. But tension between state and federal law
is not nearly enough to make out a claim that the state law is preempted.
Preemption is, in all areas where the federal government may legislate, a question
of Congressional intent (Kamin 2012, 158). Should it choose to do so, Congress
could invalidate all state marijuana laws, even those that are functionally identical
10 to the CSA; although it does not have the resources to do so, the federal
government could choose to be the sole regulator of marijuana in the United
States. But this, it quite clearly chose not to do. Instead, Congress preempted only
those state laws that stood as a positive conflict with federal law such that the two
cannot be read together.10 The preemption language Congress used in the CSA has
15 been read—albeit not in another context—to preempt only those state laws that
make it impossible for an individual to comply with both federal and state law
(Chemerinsky et al. 2015).11 It is only in such situations that the two laws cannot
be read together. It is easy enough for a Coloradan to comply with both state and
federal marijuana laws: she need only avoid all marijuana conduct to do so.
20 Because Colorado’s regulations do not require anyone to violate the CSA, therefore,
they do not create a direct conflict with federal law.
Even when Congress has clearly indicated its desire only to preempt only those
state laws that present a positive conflict with federal law, courts sometimes
nonetheless apply a broader obstacle preemption analysis.
25 Under obstacle preemption, whether a state law presents a sufficient obstacle
is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a
whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects: for when the question
is whether a federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute
must be considered and that which needs must be implied is of no less force
30 than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be
accomplished–if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated
and its provisions be refused their natural effect–the state law must yield to
the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power. (County
of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 461, 478 [2008]).
35
Under this analysis as well, the preemption argument is likely to fail. As the
California Court of Appeals noted in response to a suit by a county arguing that
California’s medical marijuana regulations were preempted by the CSA, ‘‘the
unstated predicate of this argument is that the federal government is entitled to
40 conscript a state’s law enforcement officers into enforcing federal enactments, over
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the objection of that state, and this entitlement will be obstructed’’ (County of San
Diego v. San Diego NORML, 483).
Which brings us to the core factor which is likely to doom the states’ preemption
suits: even if the Supreme Court were to disagree and find that the states’ regulatory
5 regime were preempted by federal law, it is not at all clear that the Court (or any
federal court) could provide the plaintiffs relief. While the Court could invalidate
Colorado’s regulatory regime, even the plaintiffs acknowledge that it cannot require
Colorado to recriminalize possession of marijuana (Nebraska and Oklahoma v.
Colorado, Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint, 5). Because the
10 federal government cannot require the states to enforce federal law, to pass laws
consistent with federal law, or to enforce the laws they have on the books (Printz v.
U.S., p. 512; New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 162 [1992]; Chemerinsky et al. 2015;
Mikos 2009, 1446), the effect of invalidating Colorado’s regulatory system would be
very difficult to anticipate in advance. In place of the existing marijuana regulatory
15 regime, the state might, as is its right, either repeal all marijuana laws or choose not
to enforce any of the marijuana laws remaining on its books. Such policy choices,
although clearly available to the state of Colorado under the Tenth Amendment,
might prove ruinous for Colorado’s neighbors. Unfettered marijuana production and
distribution in Colorado would almost certainly result in a glut of marijuana, much
20 of which would inevitably find its way across Colorado’s borders and beyond. If a
ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor would not necessarily cure the harms of which the states
complain, and could very well exacerbate them, they will likely be found to lack
standing to sue (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 561).
The RICO Suits12
25 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was passed in
1970 to give federal prosecutors an additional tool in fighting the mob. RICO
criminalized, among other things, the running of a business through a pattern of
racketeering activity. Congress also created a civil cause of action under RICO,
providing incentives for those injured in their ‘‘business or property’’ by RICO
30 organizations to sue; the statute provides for treble damages, and attorneys’ fees
against those found to have harmed plaintiffs through their racketeering activity.
It is clear that, as things stand, marijuana businesses qualify as RICO enterprises—
they are really nothing more than businesses that are run through a pattern of
racketeering activity. Among the crimes qualifying as racketeering activity under
35 RICO are violations of the CSA.13 Thus, the real litigation in the RICO suits will
focus not on whether the defendants are RICO enterprises, but rather on whether the
operation of these RICO businesses has harmed the plaintiffs. Congress and the
federal courts have been very careful in defining what counts as harm in this context.
First, as the statute itself makes clear, the harm cannot be to something as intangible
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as one’s sense of aesthetics or justice; the defendant must be harmed in her ‘‘business
or property.’’ Hence, for example, it is insufficient to allege, as one of the Colorado
RICO plaintiffs did, that the opening of marijuana businesses harmed her piece of
mind: ‘‘[t]he ongoing construction has already marred the mountain views from the
5 [plaintiffs’] property, thus making it less suitable for hiking and horseback riding.
The building’s purpose—the manufacture of illegal drugs—exacerbates this injury,
for when the [plaintiffs] and their children visit the property they are reminded of
the racketeering enterprise next door every time they look to the west.’’ (Safe Streets
Alliance, Phillis Windy Hope Reilly, and Michael P. Reilly v. Alternative Holistic
10 Healing, Complaint, para. 75)
That said, the RICO suits face an even more difficult obstacle. For even though
they do allege business or property harms in addition to the psychic ones just
mentioned, the plaintiffs will have a great deal of difficulty showing that the
complained-of injury was caused by the defendants’ RICO activity. The Supreme
15 Court has ruled that it is insufficient to demonstrate that the defendants were the
but-for cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries; the RICO conduct must also be the direct
cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiffs (e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp, 547
U.S. 451, 458–61 [2006]).
In the context of the Colorado suits, this directness requirement is likely fatal to
20 the damages claims. Hence, for example, in the hotelier’s lawsuit, the financial loss
alleged to be attributable to the defendants is that third-party patrons will decide
not to stay at plaintiff’s hotel as a result of the presence of defendant’s marijuana
business. Thus, the loss would be attributable to the economic decisions of other
actors and not to any conduct of the defendants themselves. In the ranch suit, the
25 link between the defendants’ criminal conduct and the plaintiffs’ harms is, if
anything, even more tenuous: the plaintiff has made no real allegation that she has
suffered a financial—as opposed to psychic—harm as a result of the defendants’
criminal conduct. Even if a depreciation in the value of the plaintiffs’ property can
fairly be tied to the defendants’ new business, plaintiffs would have to show that
30 the same diminution in value would not have occurred if the defendants were
growing tomatoes rather than marijuana on their property. These problems have
led one leading commentator to remark: ‘‘[I]t is quite possible that no plaintiff
would have standing to bring a civil RICO claim against a . . . marijuana
dispensary’’ (Mikos 2011, 653).
35 Although there are clearly a number of obstacles to recovery, the RICO suits
represent a serious threat to the Colorado marijuana industry. This has less to do
with the merits than with the fact that plaintiffs have sought each of these remedies
and have sought them from a diverse group of defendants. They have sued not only
those businesses they argue are causing (or, more accurately, will cause them harm)
40 but also, those who financed, built, insured, or otherwise aided the construction
and operation of those businesses. This is an important and troubling development
The Last Stand Against Marijuana Legalization 17
for advocates of marijuana law reform in Colorado; even if none of these plaintiffs
are able to prevail against any of these defendants, these suits will exert a not
insubstantial cost on marijuana businesses and anyone who would assist those
businesses.
5 Sheriffs’ Suit
The most recent suit filed against the state of Colorado, and perhaps the most
confounding, is the one brought by Colorado and Kansas sheriffs seeking an
injunction to undo not just Colorado’s tax and regulate system for marijuana, but
also its decision to legalize possession of small amounts of marijuana (Smith et al.
10 v. Hickenlooper, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, para. 105). The latter of these claims is
obviously unmeritorious, for reasons that should already be clear by this point in
the analysis. As discussed above, a state cannot be forced to pass criminal laws,
enforce either its laws or federal law or, as the states of Oklahoma and Nebraska
explicitly acknowledged in their suit, to keep its existing criminal laws on the
15 books. Given that, it is hard to imagine what relief the sheriffs seek with regard to
Colorado’s legalization decision. The sheriffs ask for an injunction against
Colorado’s governor ‘‘prohibiting the application and implementation’’ of
marijuana decriminalization. However, such an injunction preventing a governor
from ‘‘implementing’’ decriminalization would be the functional equivalent of the
20 federal government requiring a state to implement federal policy, a power we have
seen the federal government simply lacks, as Colorado makes clear in its response
to the Nebraska and Oklahoma lawsuit: ‘‘Ordering Colorado to recriminalize the
use and cultivation of recreational marijuana, and further ordering the State to
allocate resources to enforce that prohibition, would violate the Tenth
25 Amendment.’’ (Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado, Colorado’s Brief in
Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint, 27).
The legal reasoning of the rest of the sheriffs’ lawsuit is no more meritorious.
Like Colorado’s neighboring states or the business owner plaintiffs in the RICO
suits, the sheriffs have great difficulty showing a cognizable injury that could be
30 remedied by an appropriate federal court injunction. Their alleged harm appears to
be that they are somehow precluded from enforcing federal law which they allege
creates a crisis of conscience for them. Each of the plaintiffs, the complaint alleges:
has taken an oath of office to uphold the United States Constitution in the
performance of his duties. Each also has taken, in the same oath of office, an
35 oath to uphold the Colorado Constitution. Since the enactment of
Amendment 64, these oaths contradict each other. Each Colorado Plaintiff-
Sheriff routinely is required to violate one of these oaths in performing his
duties relating to conflicting federal and Colorado marijuana laws (Smith
et al. v. Hickenlooper, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, para. 74).
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Exactly how not enforcing federal law violates the sheriffs’ oath to obey the federal
constitution is not explained. The argument seems to be, though, that it places the
sheriffs in an impermissible bind to require them to turn a blind eye to violations
of federal law when they observe them (Smith et al. v. Hickenlooper, Plaintiffs’
5 Complaint, para. 78). This is merely another way of saying that county sheriffs have
an obligation to enforce federal law, an obligation we have seen cannot be imposed
upon them. And one of the plaintiff sheriffs has said as much publicly, albeit in
another context. In 2013, Larimer County Sheriff Justin Smith, the lead plaintiff in
the sheriffs’ lawsuit, announced on his facebook page that he would not participate
10 in the enforcement of any new federal gun control laws (Holden 2013).
Conclusion
Marijuana law and policy are changing quickly in the United States today. As with
the debate over marriage equality, change in public opinion, and at the ballot box has
moved the law forward at a pace that might have been unimaginable just five years
15 ago. And as with marriage equality, a corner seems to have been turned; with regard
to both issues, the outcome is often seen as inevitable (Wolf 2014; Wyatt 2014).
Although there appear to be majorities in favor of marijuana legalization in the
country, federal policy has been slow to change; state officials and electorates have
clearly been the initiators of policy change in this area since the 1990s. It is not
20 unusual for the states to take the lead in policy change in a given area; regional
differences and smaller stakes make innovation at the state level likelier. But
marijuana law reform is highly unusual, in fact unprecedented—never before have
a number of states chosen to legalize conduct that remains illegal under federal law.
The response of federal officials to state marijuana reform laws has been equally
25 notable. Although the Obama administration initially sent mixed signals, during the
last two years administration officials have increasingly acquiesced and even
encouraged marijuana law reform in the states. This is most evident in a 2013
Justice Department memo signaling that the administration would defer to state
laws regulating marijuana so long as the state could demonstrate effectiveness in
30 meeting eight federal criteria; Justice Department officials later extended this policy
to Indian Country as well. Meanwhile, Congress in late 2014 took a modest step
toward limiting enforcement of federal law in medical-use marijuana states, even
though this appropriations rider falls well short of stronger measures—such as the
CARERS Act—that have since been proposed.
35 Finally, the reaction to the federal government’s acquiescence to state law reform
has also been telling. As we have seen, the principal legal challenges to marijuana-
legalization measures in 2014–2015 have been filed not by federal officials but by
other states—Oklahoma and Nebraska—along with private plaintiffs and several
sheriffs both in Colorado and its neighboring states. Although these plaintiffs are
The Last Stand Against Marijuana Legalization 19
unlikely to prevail on the merits of their suits, their decision to step in as proxies for
the federal government both reveals creative lines of argumentation and challenges
the dominant expectation that in cases of conflict federal officials will generally seek
to limit state autonomy and state officials will seek to expand such autonomy.
5 This is typified, perhaps, by the reaction within Oklahoma to the state’s lawsuit
against Colorado. The week after the lawsuit was filed, a number of state officials
wrote to the Attorney General to protest his decision to sue Colorado over
marijuana legalization:
Our primary concerns surround the implications of this lawsuit for states’
10 rights, the Tenth Amendment, and the ability of states and citizens to govern
themselves as they see fit. As you know, Oklahoma has been a pioneer and a
leader in standing up to federal usurpations on everything from gun control
to Obamacare and beyond.
We believe this lawsuit against our sister state has the potential, if it were
15 to be successful at the Supreme Court, to undermine all of those efforts to
protect our own state’s right to govern itself under the Tenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution (Ritze, 2014).
The legislators’ opposition serves as a reminder that the odd path taken by
marijuana law reform has forced a reexamination of some of our basic
20 understandings of federalism. However, the federalism clash over marijuana is
ultimately resolved, a solution will need to be found that permits states to either
take ownership of the issue or to permit continued federal leadership.
Notes
I would like to thank Richard Re, Alan Chen, Robert Mikos, Allen Hopper, and
25 Erwin Chemerinsky. All remaining errors are mine.
1 The memo stated in part: ‘‘State laws or local ordinances are not a defense to civil or
criminal enforcement of federal law with respect to such conduct, including enforcement
of the CSA. Those who engage in transactions involving the proceeds of such activity
may also be in violation of federal money laundering statutes and other federal financial
30 laws’’ (Cole 2011).
2 As this 2014 FinCEN memo stated in part: ‘‘Because federal law prohibits the distribution
and sale of marijuana, financial transactions involving a marijuana-related business would
generally involve funds derived from illegal activity. Therefore, a financial institution is
required to file a [Suspicious Activity Report] on activity involving a marijuana-related
35 business (including those duly licensed under state law), in accordance with this guidance
and FinCEN’s suspicious activity reporting requirements and related thresholds.’’
3 This is why even the concept of an enforceable waiver is insufficient to solve the current
problems with marijuana’s continuing illegality. See, for example, Kleiman 2013.
20 S. Kamin
4 As the author pointed out, Obama is quite able to argue both sides of an issue almost at
the same time: ‘‘As is his habit, he nimbly argued the other side. ‘Having said all that,
those who argue that legalizing marijuana is a panacea and it solves all these social
problems I think are probably overstating the case. There is a lot of hair on that policy.
5 And the experiment that’s going to be taking place in Colorado and Washington is going
to be, I think, a challenge’’’ (Remnick 2014).
5 See, for example, Sullum 2014 :
The Drug Policy Alliance describes this provision, versions of which Rohrabacher has
been championing since 2003, as ‘‘language prohibiting the U.S. Justice Department
10 from spending any money to undermine state medical marijuana laws.’’ Similarly, the
Marijuana Policy Project says Rohrabacher’s amendment ‘‘prohibit[s] the U.S. Justice
Department—which includes the DEA—from interfering with state-level medical
marijuana laws.’’ But actions that could be described as undermining or interfering
with medical marijuana laws do not necessarily ‘‘prevent’’ states from ‘‘implementing’’
15 those laws, which is the actual language used in the bill.
6 Interestingly, Congress included in the same piece of legislation rider that would prevent
federal funds from being spent to implement the District of Columbia’s decision to
legalize marijuana for all adult users. See, Consolidated and Further Continuing
20 Appropriations Act, 2015, paragraph 809:
(a) None of the Federal funds contained in this Act may be used to enact or carry out
any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated
with the possession, use, or distribution of any schedule I substance under the
CSA 21 (21 U.S.C. 801 and the following.) or any tetrahydrocannabinols
25 derivative.
(b) None of the funds contained in this Act may be used to enact any law, rule, or
regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated with the possession,
use, or distribution of any schedule I substance under the CSA (21 U.S.C. 801 and
the following) or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative for recreational purposes.
30 That legalization was curtailed only in the District of Columbia likely says more about
the federal government’s complicated relationship with its seat of government than it
does about changing views of marijuana law reform, however.
7 I have argued elsewhere (Chemerinsky et al. 2015, 80) for a cooperative federalism
solution not unlike CARERS, one that gives the federal government a leading role in
35 those states that wish to retain marijuana prohibition but that allows other states to
opt out if they believe that regulation and taxation is a better approach than
prohibition:
Under our cooperative federalism approach the Attorney General would be required
to create a certification process allowing states to opt out of the CSA’s marijuana
40 provisions if state laws and regulatory frameworks satisfy enforcement criteria that
the DOJ has already announced. In optout states certified by the Attorney General,
only state law would govern marijuana-related activities and the CSA marijuana
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provisions would cease to apply. Federal agencies could continue to cooperate with
opt-out states and their local governments to jointly enforce marijuana laws, but
state law rather than the CSA would control within those states’ borders. Equally
important, nothing would change in those states content with the status quo under
5 the CSA.
8 In order for one state to sue another in the Supreme Court, it must allege that its sister
state’s conduct would amount to a casus belli—grounds for war—if committed by one
sovereign nation against another. See, for example, Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554,
10 571 n.18 (1983)
9 One of the suits also named state and local officials as defendants; the other did not.
10 See CSA, Sec. 903:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part
of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including
15 criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which
would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict
between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot
consistently stand together.
20 11 Chemerinsky, et al. 2015 write: ‘‘The phrase ‘positive conflict . . . so that the two
cannot consistently stand together’ in section 903 has been interpreted as narrowly
restricting the preemptive reach of the CSA to ‘cases of an actual conflict with federal
law such that ‘‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility.’’’’’ (quoting S. Blasting Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes Cnty, 288 F.3 d 584, 591 (4th
25 Cir. 2002)).
12 A much shorter version of this analysis appeared in Kamin 2015.
13 The RICO ACT, section 1961(1)(d), includes in ‘‘racketeering activity’’ ‘‘the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the CSA),
30 punishable under any law of the United States.’’
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